MIDDLE EAST FREE TRADE AREA (Mefta) BUSINESS PEACE PLANS
NUCLEAR PEACE PLANS
DR. S. C. YUTER
New U.S.
Foreign Policy Based on Cheap Oil/
Free Trade Jobs for Gaza Business Peace/ Doing Business With Hamas/
Implementing Port Mefta/ Gaza First Business Peace Starting With
Casino/ Palestine Gaza State in Gaza By the End of 2009/ Gaza Mefta By the
End of 2009 and Return of Gaza Refugees/ Universally-Binding Nuclear Test
Ban Can Block North Korean and Iranian Nuclear Missiles/ Blocking an
Iranian Missile Warhead/ Argument to China for Its Support of a
Universally-Binding Test Ban Treaty/ More Port Mefta and Gaza
Mefta Details/ Sunken Highway From Port Mefta to the West Bank and Jordan/
Power-Desalination Plant in Port Mefta/ A Provisional West Bank State/
Multinational Force and Observers/ Draft MFO Peacekeeping Annex to
MFO Protocol of Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace/ No-War Mefta Business Peace
Is Attainable With the Support of Israel, U.S., Egypt and Other Arab
States, and At Least the Gaza Palestinians/ Israeli-Palestinian
Coexistence by Kissinger Principles/ South Lebanon Mefta/Golan Mefta
NEW
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON CHEAP OIL
Cheap Oil Helped By World Tribalism to Spur
U.S. Economy and Gain Victory in Iraq,
With Universal Test Ban to Block
Iran and North Korea Bombs, and an International
Middle East Free Trade
Area to Calm Gaza and Advance Peace Process
Cheap oil should
be the paramount foreign policy of the United States helped by world
tribalism which drives ethnic entities to independence as captains of
their own ships. World tribalism is rooted in America’s Declaration of
Independence. It is illustrated by the ethnic break up of Yugoslavia into
smaller countries including the state of Serbia and Montenegro followed by
the independence of Montenegro. But world tribalism can
successfully be opposed by overwhelming brutal force as in Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq. Cheap oil is defined as under $20 a barrel for benchmark
West Texas Intermediate crude in a glutted market.
A cheap oil
policy puts the economic well being of the American people above other
policy values. It encourages the maximum production of crude in every oil
producing area, especially Iraq, by anyone to help glut the market.
Russian and other oil companies made very profitable deals with Saddam
Hussein's government for the development of Iraqi oil reserves and should
be encouraged to fulfill those deals. Cheap oil would drive down inflation
and spur the United States economy and thus the stock markets and bring
back cheap gasoline.
In July 1986 the
price of a loaded barrel of OPEC crude oil dropped to under $10. With an
average Persian Gulf production cost of under $5 the profit was about
100%. So the current price of over $50 is unreasonable. In a glutted
market, under $20 is reasonable since the average production cost of
non-Persian Gulf crude is under $10 a barrel.
A prime
candidate for world tribalism is the Shia in the oil producing Saudi
Eastern Province. A Shia leader seeking independence could call on the
great many Shia there to rise and overthrow the local Sunni Saudi
government to establish a democracy. If so, the United States should
defend them from the Saudis, starting with the uprising, if they agree
always to produce enough crude oil to glut the market, to always sell
their benchmark light crude to United States buyers for $10 a barrel and
provide long-term bases to block Iran from dominating the Persian Gulf.
And also allow American oil companies carte blanche to develop new fields
of crude oil and gas at reasonable royalties.
With the vast
U.S. market partially satisfied by $10 a barrel oil and the world market
glutted, the world price should drop to under $20. For the American
gasoline consumer every 5% drop results in a saving of 10 cents a gallon
and $14 billion a year. So a $30 drop from $50 or 60% would save $1.20 a
gallon and $168 billion. That is a lot of purchasing power remaining in
the country to spur the economy.
Cheap oil is a
powerful nonproliferation instrument. It would deprive Iran of the many
billions needed to develop and manufacture small nuclear warheads for its
medium range missiles because each dollar drop in the price of a barrel of
crude deprives Iran of a billion dollars per year. So all their
petrobillions would be needed for huge food and fuel subsidies and welfare
payments to prevent riots by the Iranian people and change of the regime.
Cheap oil also could deny terrorists the Muslim petrobillions they need to
buy a North Korean primitive ship container bomb to destroy a major
American port and thus deny the North needed billions to develop missile
warheads.
A paper prepared
for the U.S. Department of Energy in February 2005, entitled “Costs of
U.S. Oil Dependence: 2005 Update,” estimated the economic costs of $35-$45
a barrel of crude for 2005 as $150-$250 billion, primarily the transfer of
American wealth to oil exporting countries. The economic costs in 2006 of
still higher prices are correspondingly larger. A drop to $20 would
greatly reduce energy costs, with a corresponding spurt in the American
economy and gasoline around $1 a gallon, and could double the value of the
stock markets to the benefit of millions of American investors.
Cheap oil
advances freedom. “The price of oil and the pace of freedom operate in an
inverse relationship in petrolist states – states with weak institutions
and high dependence on oil for their G.D.P.” That is the “First Law
of Petropolitics” according to Thomas L. Friedman, author and New York
Times columnist. As the price of oil goes down the pace of freedom
goes up. Petrolist states include Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia. Friedman
notes that “high oil prices is a black tide of petro-authoritarianism
emanating from Russia blunting the tide of free markets and free people.”
Cheap Oil Victory in Iraq
World tribalism
is now the very likely outcome of the Iraq war, with Iraq breaking up into
the oil rich regions of a Kurdish northern Iraq and Shia southern Iraq
separated by a Sunni central region. A cheap oil policy would humanely
encourage a split short of sovereignty and help maximize Iraqi crude oil
production. The recommendations of the Iraq Study Group of a strong
central government and against division into three regions are no longer
realistic because with civil warfare tribalism trumps unification.
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has recently similarly concluded
that Iraq should be divided into three regions. He stated that military
victory is no longer possible in Iraq but a rapid withdrawal would have
“disastrous consequences.” He said that the United States must choose
between stability and democracy in Iraq — and that democracy, for now, is
out of reach. "Iraq is not a nation in the historic sense," he noted,
pointing to the ferocity of the conflicts among Kurds and Sunni and Shiite
Arabs. The United States should focus on preventing the emergence of a
"fundamentalist jihadist regime" in Baghdad and enlist other countries to
help stabilize Iraq. The task now is to manage the devolution of Iraq into
a “confederal state” in which Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish regions would
govern themselves with substantial autonomy, Dr. Kissinger said.
Former Secretary
of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld prior to his December resignation proposed a
range of options for a major adjustment of U.S. policy in Iraq. Among the
options were to reduce U.S. bases to five by July 2007 and “withdraw U.S.
forces from vulnerable positions – cities, patrolling, etc. – to a Quick
Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be
available when Iraqi forces needed assistance.”
If the United States withdraws its land forces from Iraq, Iran could use
its very large conventional forces by blackmail or invasion to
significantly limit the amount of crude oil produced by Iraq and adjust
its own production to control the price and thus damage the U.S. economy.
So Washington will need five long-term secure bases of quick reaction and
special operation forces backed by at least one carrier expeditionary
strike group in the Persian Gulf mainly to block Teheran from controlling
the price of oil. American forces would withdraw from the inhabited areas
to these bases to minimize American bloodshed, protect the borders and
especially to maximize the flow of Iraqi oil. The bulk of American
forces would be withdrawn by July 2007. Pipelines would be protected by
local tribes with payment based on the amount of oil flow.
Iraqis alone would run their regions of Iraq with their own funds.
The Kurds and Shia each probably want their own independent region with
their own laws, control of their own oil and defense of their own borders,
mainly funded by their own oil revenues. So for Sunni support of a divided
Iraq and to avoid bitter warfare over oil the Sunni-Kurd border would be
drawn to include in the Sunni region a satisfactory part of the Kirkuk oil
region. The Kirkuk oil region lies outside the present Kurdish region. The
U.S. would have a secure base nearby to help guarantee an agreed
Sunni-Kurd border and help the Sunni government purge local and
foreign terrorists for its own protection.
A weak central government in Baghdad dedicated mainly to foreign affairs
and local government is very likely, as is break up of the Iraqi armed
forces and police along sectarian lines. Baghdad and other mixed
Sunni-Shia cities are very likely to be partitioned into separate Sunni
and Shia areas defended by their own militias reinforced by former
soldiers and police. Washington would help the international community led
by the United Nations with the task of humanely managing the
devolution into three regions with minimum bloodshed in such city
partitioning as well as in any mass population movements and ethnic
cleansing in the provinces.
This cheap oil
policy and resulting spurred U.S. economy with minimal American bloodshed
and massively cut costs in Iraq while blocking Iran and North Korean
nuclear missiles and protecting American ports can credibly be claimed as
a victory by the Bush administration.
Universal Test Ban
To help prevent
further proliferation cheap oil can be supplemented by a
universally-binding test ban treaty that outlaws all nuclear tests and
threatened tests anywhere by anyone, including nonsignatories like Iran
and North Korea. The UN Charter similarly binds nonsignatories. Both
Beijing and Moscow support a UBTBT. If supported by Washington the treaty
would unite virtually the entire international community to block Iran and
North Korea from demonstrating by a successful test that it has mastered
the very complex technology of a nuclear missile warhead. (All declared
nuclear weapons states required many tests, and Israel twice tested
howitzer-launched nuclear warheads off the coast of South Africa according
to a Russian arms control expert.) The North’s underground test did not
demonstrate mastery of the required missile warhead technology. And Iran
cannot blackmail neighbors with a reliable though untested simple bomb
which is so large that it is deliverable only by a vulnerable aircraft or
detectable container ship.
A UBTBT can
promptly enter into force since only agreement to its terms by the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) is required and
virtually all parties to the unenacted Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would
quickly adhere to legislate a ban with the required two-thirds of
the states including the P-5 as parties.
The treaty would be enforced by a volunteer state authorized by the UN
Security Council after the International Atomic Energy Agency certified a
violation by North Korea or Iran. Preparations for a test or even a
threat to test violates the UBTBT. Washington would likely volunteer to
surgically destroy Pyongyang’s or Teheran’s targetable nuclear weapons
facilities with conventional cruise missiles if it did not verifiably and
irreversibly dismantle its weapons facilities.
Since the North
and Iran cannot rely on China or Russia to block Security Council
enforcement of a UBTBT, China with massive economic and energy aid by
South Korea and Japan for Pyongyang should be able to convince it to end
an enormously expensive nuclear weapons program destined to fail.
And with significant economic support by France, Germany and Britain for
Teheran, Russia should be able to persuade it to agree to Moscow’s
proposal to carry out uranium enrichment only on Russian soil so the
uranium cannot be enriched to weapons grade, and return spent reactor fuel
to Russia so the fuel cannot be reprocessed to weapon plutonium. Both the
North and Iran would also have to subscribe to the Additional Protocol to
the Safeguards Agreement to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to provide
transparency of their peaceful nuclear facilities to prevent successful
cheating.
In return,
both North Korea and Iran would see the end of all sanctions and
normalization of relations with the United States.
Middle East Free Trade Area
Hamas will not
give up its religious goal: “End the Israeli occupation of
Palestine,” referring to the land between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean. So Hamas will never recognize the right of Israel to exist.
In place of recognition it offers a 10-year hudna (truce) if Israel ends
the occupation, which Israel did in the Gaza Strip. Since Hamas is
responsible for the welfare of all the Palestinian people, it should be
willing to extend that hudna to the occupied West Bank.
Hamas is deeply
concerned with the welfare of the Palestinian people. Therefore it is
likely to support a Middle East Free Trade Area (Mefta) along the Gaza
coast starting with a prototype Port Mefta to help kick-start the Gaza
economy and boost Gazan employment, plus the credible promise of full
employment in a later Gaza Mefta in 20% of the strip. Mefta
was deemed of “great interest” by Israel’s government in July 2003.
See the Prime Minister’s Bureau July
31, 2003, letter in rectangle PM Office Letter above.
The Olmert government would welcome the opportunity
to replace its discredited West Bank convergence policy with a Mefta
policy that advances the peace process as called for by the international
community, especially since the main Israeli costs are paying the
Palestinian duties and taxes and doing business with Hamas.
Port Mefta is a
very investor-friendly free trade, tourist and gambling area established
soon between Deir El Balah and the former Gush Katif (7 sq. km. or
2.5 sq. mi.) under the administration and policing of the U.S.-led
Multinational Force and Observers which monitors the peace in the Sinai.
The MFO leases the port area from the Palestinian Authority for a
renewable 35 years. Any nationality can do free trade business in Port
Mefta by renting a building site from the MFO and constructing a building
at its own expense. The building site rentals help fund the MFO. The Mefta
currency is the U.S. dollar and English is the official language.
In 2009 the prototype Port Mefta is followed by an MFO-administered Gaza
Mefta which adds the former Gush Katif area (except Morag where high rise
apartments are planned for Palestinians). Gaza Mefta is a combined duty-
and tax-free Singapore, Las Vegas and Riviera with ample affordable power
and desalinated water using cheap gas off the Gaza coast. Port Mefta would
pave the way to soon separate Syria from Iran with a credible promise of a
future Golan Mefta to follow Gaza Mefta. A Golan Mefta would set the stage
for a South Lebanon Mefta to help stabilize Lebanon.
Port Mefta
provides free access by the Palestinians to its new seaport and a rebuilt
Dahaniya airport which, with the Rafah terminal, are secured by MFO
international police to block smuggling and activists that would threaten
Mefta. And with economic viability and the credible promise of full
employment for Gazans, Port Mefta helps create stability in Gaza. Calm is
maintained by the overwhelming combined forces of Hamas and Fatah based on
the equitable sharing of the many Mefta jobs among their people – i.e.
jobs for Gaza peace. After a few years of Gaza peace and an Israel free of
Palestinian rockets and violence the stage would be set for a
nonthreatening democratic Palestinian state beginning in 80% of a free
trade Gaza Strip in business peace and security with Israel.
James
Wolfensohn, the former Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement, in April 2005
stated that the Port Mefta proposal is interesting and would help
kick-start the Gaza economy and boost Gaza employment. He proposed to
connect Gaza with the West Bank by a sunken four-lane highway. Under the
Mefta plan, the Gaza terminal of the highway is Port Mefta. The surface of
the highway is patrolled solely by MFO police so that Palestinians can
freely move back and forth between Gaza and the West Bank. The MFO police
mainly comprise the Sinai MFO Fiji battalion and include former Israeli
and Palestinian police. Port Mefta is surrounded by an Israeli-designed
anti-smuggling barrier.
The MFO promptly begins construction of Port Mefta and the sunken highway,
starting with a barge-accessible harbor quickly constructed by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers to bring in building materials from Egypt and
Israel. The construction of the Port Mefta infrastructure including a
large power/desalination plant, the commercial buildings and the sunken
highway will require every construction worker Palestinians can muster
since nonexecutive labor must be Palestinian. Then there is the
construction of the far larger Gaza Mefta starting in 2009. Construction
plus manning the administrative buildings, consulates, hotels, factories,
casinos, stores and duty- and tax-free shops will provide full employment
for Gaza’s workers. A successful Gaza Mefta could eventually generate
enough jobs to support all Diaspora Palestinian refugees willing to move
to a booming Palestinian state in Gaza and thus help solve the refugees
problem.
The West Bank quiets in order for its workers, merchants and products to
travel via a temporary Israeli safe route in Israeli-guarded convoys to a
booming Gaza, and especially to help build the sunken highway. Israel
withdraws behind its completed defensive barrier from substantially all
Palestinian areas occupied since September 2000, when the current
intifada started. The quality of life of West Bankers greatly improves
with free movement there and to Gaza and thus the rest of the world. The
sunken highway between Port Mefta and the West Bank is completed by the
end of 2008.
After a few years of a peaceful nonthreatening democratic Palestinian
state in Gaza it can spread to most of the West Bank in business peace and
security with Israel and the remaining settlements. Real peace is not
achievable because of intense hatred whether or not Hamas is governing.
And especially because of the Arab view that any peace is only temporary
until they are strong enough to destroy the Jewish state. And also because
Israel will not give up Old Jerusalem with its Temple Mount and Western
Wall. So there is no end of the conflict. But hateful Palestinians and
Israelis still can do business together for mutual profit – i.e. in
business peace without bloodshed.
Hamas really
needs a Port Mefta: To prevent civil warfare between Hamas and Fatah
fighters, to gain time to consolidate its power, to help rid Gaza of all
IDF forces, to help significantly increase payroll and institutional
funding, to begin to end hardship in Gaza by a vast increase in
employment and to make a 10-year hudna business peace with Israel -- all
without giving up its goal of destroying the Jewish state, left by Hamas
to the next generation. After 10 years the Palestinians can
democratically decide to continue full employment and business peace with
Israel or renew the armed struggle.
FREE TRADE JOBS FOR GAZA BUSINESS PEACE
Hamas needs a
long period of calm to consolidate its power and generate many Palestinian
jobs. It has to do business with Israel in order to govern
successfully-- i.e. it needs business peace. Hamas offers Israel a 10-year
hudna (ceasefire or truce). During that ceasefire a great many good
Palestinian jobs can be generated by a very investor-friendly and secure
international Gaza Middle East Free Trade Area, beginning soon with a
prototype Port Mefta.
During the 10
years, each side would recognize the other’s right to exist for 10 years
and abide by previous agreements between the sides. Except that Hamas will
not give up its goal of destroying the Jewish state, but that is left by
Hamas to the next generation. So there can be no lasting political peace.
But 10 years is a very long time in the Middle East.
In return for
Hamas exerting its best efforts to end substantially all violence
emanating from the Gaza Strip, especially the rocketing, for a
predetermined period (say 30 days), Israel then would enter
negotiations with the MFO (primarily) and the PNA of a Port Mefta Treaty
while trading calm for calm in Gaza. The negotiations could be facilitated
by Mr. Wolfensohn as head of a Gaza business peace team in his capacity of
former president of the World Bank and not as a representative of the
Quartet. Otherwise, Mefta-supporter Dr. Osama El Baz, senior advisor to
Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, would lead the team to help negotiate the
treaty. Dr. El Baz would be helped by high-level Egyptian officers
stationed in Gaza. Negotiators of the MFO, PNA and Israel would start with
a proposed Port Mefta Treaty in the corresponding rectangle above. The PNA
negotiators would include Col. Mohammed Dahlan because the success of Port
Mefta requires the joint forces of Hamas and Dahlan’s Preventive Security
Service (over 10 thousand fighters) to help keep Gaza calm and the
security-fenced Port Mefta free of terrorism. Also Dr. Saeb Erekat
representing Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas,
and also the PLO if the PLO is acceptable to Hamas as a party to the
treaty.
When a Port
Mefta Treaty without its annexes is signed by each of the parties, Israel
would open the gate to renewed PNA financing, including payroll and
institutional expenses, by remitting to the PNA the Palestinian duties and
taxes collected by Israel. Continued remittances would be subject to
agreement to all of the annexes.
Mefta can deliver full employment in Gaza. Those jobs would be hostage to
a good neighbor Gaza whoever leads the PNA.
DOING BUSINESS WITH HAMAS
Hamas, the
Islamic Resistance Movement, is a religious and charitable institution
which provides education, health and social welfare services. Alongside
its civic activity is a military wing which conducts armed resistance
activities. Hamas's sweeping victory in the Palestinian Legislative
Council election in January 2006 is partly due to the disintegration of
Fatah as well as the failure of the Palestinian Authority to function as a
government, and rampant corruption within Fatah's ranks. Most Palestinian
voters are unlikely to have voted for an Islamic Palestine like Taliban’s
Afghanistan.
Hamas will not
give up its goal of destroying the Jewish state. However, there is a
historical basis for Hamas to agree to a 10-year hudna (truce or
ceasefire).
Hamas wants to
be a player in the international politics of the Middle East and be
removed from the U.S. and European lists of recognized international
terrorist organizations. On September 25, 2005, with Egypt’s urging,
Senior Hamas leader Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar declared “an end to its
operations from the Gaza Strip against the Israeli occupation.” Hamas is
willing to refrain from violence if reciprocated by Israel. Former Senior
Hamas leader Dr. Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, prior to his assassination by
Israel in April 2004, offered a 10-year hudna if Israel withdrew from all
of the land it occupied in the 1967 war and allowed the establishment of a
Palestinian state. With the withdrawal by Israel from all of the Gaza land
it occupied in the 1967 war, Hamas should agree to a 10-year hudna to
stabilize Gaza and help boost the economic, social and cultural life of
the Palestinians there. But now that it is responsible for the welfare of
all the Palestinian people, it should be willing to extend that hudna to
the West Bank.
Foreign donors
are ready to spend billions for infrastructure and economic development
projects in Gaza as well as guarantee investor loans. Prosperous
Palestinian exiles are a huge reservoir of potential investment. But
“[h]aving capital and resources is not enough. Economic development needs
regulation; it needs a legal system and political protection for
investments. The absence of these is partly why there is no investment in
Palestine. Investors are afraid to come. Economic reform cannot be
undertaken unless there is political stability and a strategic vision in
the PA.” Abdel Rahman Tamimi, Director of the Palestinian Hydrology Group
for Water and Environment Resources Development (Bitterlemons, Ed. 33,
Sept. 1, 2005).
Mefta can
be the economic engine driving the economic recovery of the rest of a
job-generating, nonthreatening, politically stable,
investor-friendly Gaza Strip free trade area as the strategic
vision of a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority.
Under the Mefta
plan Hamas controls which Palestinians get the tens of thousands of good
Palestinian jobs in Port Mefta. Those jobs can help Hamas extend the hudna
to the Preventive Security Service fighters controlled by Fatah
leader Mohammed Dahlan. With a fair share of those jobs from Hamas,
Dahlan can motivate his fighters to partner with Hamas fighters to
overcome any violent opposition from Islamic Jihad and rejectionist Fatah
fighters. They, in return for their own fair shares of the jobs, help keep
Gaza quiet and to avoid dreaded civil war. So those Mefta jobs
become "jobs for peace" in Gaza.
IMPLEMENTING PORT MEFTA
Having
disengaged from Gaza, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon likely intended to
complete the West Bank security separation barrier, keep as much of the
West Bank as possible, extend the 1967 Green Line eastward by
retaining large settlement blocks and hold on to the Jordan Valley as a
buffer against a future threat from the east, all while waiting until a
Palestinian partner emerges for a major territorial compromise final peace
deal.
Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert, the leader of the Kadima (Forward) party which won the most
seats in the March 2006 Knesset election, is likely to follow that plan.
The separation barrier is intended to encompass the major settlement
blocks. Olmert hopes to persuade the United States and thus other major
countries to accept that separation barrier border as the final border in
the absence of negotiating such a border with the Palestinians. With Hamas
not even agreeing that Israel is entitled to be a state, the likely
outcome will not be an internationally recognized border but a de
facto border.
Dr. Osama El
Baz, longtime political advisor of Egypt President Hosni Mubarak, in a New
York conference with the author on August 4, 1996, supported a Port Mefta.
So Egypt would play a leading role in implementing Port Mefta to
help stabilize Gaza.
The MFO
soon begins construction of Port Mefta (pursuant to a master plan) and the
sunken highway. The infrastructure cost, including a $250 million
power/desalination plant (German funded), plus the cost of the Gaza-West
Bank sunken highway is under $one billion, raised mostly from the European
Union and Japan. The owners of the hotels, office buildings
factories, consulates and duty- and tax-free shops pay for their own
buildings on leased land with the rentals financing Mefta operating
expenses. The construction of Port Mefta and the sunken highway is
supervised by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers so construction should be
substantially free of corruption. The Corps of Engineers quickly
builds a temporary harbor for Port Mefta, using warfare techniques. The
temporary harbor is used to bring in construction materials by barge
from Egypt and Israel to rapidly start construction of the Port Mefta
infrastructure.
The Palestinians, especially Hamas,
don’t have to agree to end the conflict or give up their right of return
to 1948 Palestine. All Mefta land is their land though rented to the MFO
for a renewable 35 years. A nonthreatening democratic Palestinian state
can later begin in a peaceful duty-free Gaza Strip with future full
employment for Gazans. All Diaspora Gaza refugees have the right of return
to Gaza if they have an authentic job there.
Hamas retains its long-term goal of an Islamic state like Iran in all of
Mandate Palestine in place of Israel. In the meantime, as head of the
Palestinian National Authority government, it deals with the "Zionist
entity" in an interim truce that leaves open final status issues;
effectively a long-term interim agreement as was sought by Sharon with an
optional peaceful Palestinian state in Gaza with provisional borders.
The leaders of the Abu Samadana clan and other long-time smuggling
families can calm southern Gaza. They mostly run the Rafah economy. The
problem is they need its tunnels between Egypt Rafah and Gaza Rafah for
their smuggling business. Most of the illicit traffic of weapons,
insurgents, drugs and other contraband goes through them. There is a
carrot and stick to persuade the smugglers to end their tunnel smuggling
business. The carrot is to convert them from the smuggling business to the
gambling business. Egypt has the stick with its border troops to
close the tunnels on its side of the border and confiscate tunneling
machinery.
While Hamas opposes gambling, it agrees to the gambling business,
implemented by Dahlan, with the understanding that religious Moslems will
not go to the casinos.
Hamas has at least 5,000 fighters in Gaza and Dahlan can control even more
with a credible promise of good jobs in Port Mefta. Palestinian Islamic
Jihad has less than 200 in Gaza and the Popular Front even less. Disturb
Gaza’s quiet and they, as well as any opposing Fatah hardliners, will be
expelled from Gaza or jailed. To help keep Gaza quiet Hamas also
gives good jobs to ceasefire-observing militant leaders and their
designees. So, with Hamas controlling the Gaza government in cooperation
with Dahlan, the remaining opposition factions help keep Gaza quiet and
especially to avoid a dreaded civil war.
Israel would
support a Mefta in Gaza. “We find the ideas you presented in your letter
regarding a Free Trade Area along the Gaza Shoreline to be of great
interest.” See the Prime Minister’s Bureau July 31, 2003, letter in
rectangle PM Office Letter above.
The MFO should be acceptable by both sides to administer and police Port
Mefta to help build peaceful business coexistence between the two sides.
Among its 11 members are Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand,
Norway and the U.S., who leads it.
The MFO leases the 7 sq. km. (2.5 sq. mi.) Port Mefta area from the
Palestinians for a renewable 35 years at a rent of 20 percent of the very
high land rentals the MFO receives. The remaining 80 percent funds Mefta’s
undonated capital and operating expenses.
Egypt and Jordan play a major role in Mefta. The MFO international police
force comprises the MFO Fiji battalion, transferred from the Sinai, and
also includes Palestinians, Israelis, Egyptians and Jordanians, as well as
troops of other MFO members. The Fiji battalion formerly stationed with
UNIFIL in Lebanon replaces the Sinai Fiji battalion.
A
temporary casino is promptly built by Dahlan in a highly secured area
adjacent the former Gush Katif. It is replaced by a permanent casino after
Port Mefta is established. Israel allows Israelis to visit and gamble
along with other tourists as long as Gaza is quiet. The Palestinian
Authority gives an agreed percentage of the gambling jobs and profits to
the Abu Samadana and other long-time smuggler families to convert them
from smuggling to the gambling business in return for verifiably
destroying their tunnels.
In a 93-day peace mission around the world during April-July 2003 the
author and his wife met with Middle East peace experts in 12 foreign
ministries to discuss his Port Mefta peace plan. All supported it. A
report is under the Mideast Peace Mission rectangle at the top.
The word Mefta is very similar to the Hebrew and Arab word for "key." So
Mefta can be a key to calm and peaceful business coexistence between the
two sides, starting in the Gaza Strip.
GAZA FIRST BUSINESS PEACE STARTING WITH
CASINO
Hamas with Dahlan's Preventive Security Service are strong enough
to control and quiet the Gaza Strip if there is a Mefta jobs payoff. Most
Gazans would support Mefta and consequent business peace with Israel,
starting with the temporary gambling casino in the future Port Mefta area.
The temporary casino, called the Gaza Riviera Casino, initially is in a
temporary building in a highly secured area adjacent the north end of the
former Gush Katif. Israel allows Israelis to visit and gamble along with
other tourists as long as Gaza is quiet.
The first Israel-Palestinian business deal considered by the Israel
government during the intifada was an April 2001 Palestinian offer to
enforce peace in the Jordan Valley if Israel allowed Israeli gamblers back
to a refurbished Oasis Casino in Jericho. (Gambling is illegal in Israel.)
But wide opposition developed to allowing Israelis to enrich Palestinians
in Jericho while they attacked Israelis elsewhere.
The Oasis Casino was erected at a cost of $50 million, took two years to
construct and was opened in September 1998, with English the official
language of its work force. The gambling center and linked 181-room hotel
(built in July 2000) became a popular destination. It lured
gambling-struck Israelis to its tables in droves, who spent an average of
$250 million a year in American dollars. The average player spent $225 a
day playing roulette, blackjack, poker, baccarat or the gaming machines.
Its average daily gross was $680,000. Within a few months of its opening,
the casino had recovered its start-up costs. It was the Palestinian
Authority's largest private employer with 800 Palestinian employees and
285 foreign employees from 29 countries. It was open 24 hours a day, seven
days a week. With as many as 2,300 people packing the floor, 35 gaming
tables and 220 slot machines kept them busy. Ninety four percent of its
visitors were Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs.
Arafat's former economics adviser, Muhammed Rashid, holds a 23% stake in
the Oasis Casino; a further 15% is held by Casinos Austria International
Ltd., the company which ran the casino, while the remaining 62% is in the
hands of Casinos Austria head Martin Schlaff, who represents unidentified
investors. Rashid arranges for the temporary transfer of sufficient
gambling equipment from the Oasis Casino to the Gaza Riviera Casino for
Casinos Austria to successfully run it using former Palestinian and
foreign Oasis Casino employees while training new Gaza workers selected by
Dahlan. In return Israel allows Israelis to gamble at a reopened Oasis
Casino as long as the West Bank is quiet.
The Gaza casino is securely accessed by Israelis and other tourists,
initially in armored buses, via the Kisufim Junction road (242) and the
Katif Junction road (240) to the junction with the shore road (230), about
two kilometers south of the casino. Gamblers could stay at a renovated
Palm Beach Hotel one kilometer south of that shore road junction. Later,
hotels and tourist attractions are built in the former Gush Katif,
especially in areas where the local Al Muwasi Palestinians live, as well
as along a boardwalk parallel to the shore line near the Gaza Riviera
Casino.
After Port Mefta is established a permanent Gaza casino is built to
replace the temporary casino. Dahlan and Rashid jointly get 15% as deal
makers, the smuggler families 15% for going out of the smuggling business,
Casinos Austria 15% for designing and running the casino and the Schlaff
investors group 55% for providing the needed capital.
PALESTINE GAZA STATE IN GAZA BY THE END
OF 2009
"True
(Palestinian) reform will require entirely new political and economic
institutions based on democracy, market economies and action against
terrorism," President George W. Bush said on June 24, 2002. Olmert
supports the road map to a nonthreatening Palestinian state based on
Bush's June 24, 2002 statement. So the stage is set for a nonthreatening
democratic Palestinian state beginning in Gaza if acceptable to Israel and
not later than 2009. The planned G8 funding of Gaza of up to $3 billion a
year for three years is available to rebuild Palestine Gaza, which
comprises 80% of the Gaza Strip.
Palestine Gaza would have most of the attributes of sovereignty
including its own money and a vote in the United Nations and other
international organizations. Its armament would be limited to the
Palestinian's legal (under Oslo II) light weapons there.
Palestine Gaza's duty-free status would begin with a high-tech
anti-smuggling barrier surrounding the land portion of the Gaza Strip. All
Diaspora Gaza refugees who get jobs in Palestine Gaza could move there
with their immediate families (lineal ascendants and descendants),
followed by non-Gaza refugees.
The U.N. Security Council guarantees Israel a secure easement through
Palestine Gaza via Kisufim routes 242, 4 and 240 for unlimited use by
Israelis in Mefta. Palestine Gaza cannot threaten Israel because the
Security Council also guarantees that the Palestinian state cannot have
heavy weapons like tanks, artillery and aircraft, or rocket or mortar
Israel, and cannot have foreign military alliances, or foreign troops or
police in its territory, or block flights over its territory. The U.S.
would veto any Security Council resolution condemning Israel for military
action against Palestine Gaza for violating a guarantee, for example by
rocketing or heavy arming.
GAZA MEFTA BY THE END OF 2009
AND RETURN OF GAZA
REFUGEES
To
generate hundreds of thousands of good Palestinian jobs and help solve the
refugees problem, Gaza Mefta by the end of 2009 replaces the former Gush
Katif block of settlements in the southwest Gaza Strip (less Morag) and
includes the prototype Port Mefta (a total of 74 sq. km., 28 sq. mi.). A
35-year renewable MFO lease from the Palestinians at a rental of 20% of
skyrocketed building site rents collected from private businesses helps
fund the state of Palestine Gaza in the remaining 80% of the high-tech
fenced Gaza Strip. The Palestinian state is established when Gaza Mefta is
implemented, if the state is not blocked by Hamas.
Gaza Mefta provides full employment of the Palestinian workers living in
the Gaza Strip. It facilitates Israeli labor-intensive manufacturing in
Gaza and substantially boosts tourism in the Palestinian National
Authority, Israel, Jordan and Egypt.
Israelis would make business deals with Arabs in Mefta even in the absence
of normalization of political and economic relations with such countries
as Saudi Arabia and Syria. Thus, an Israeli-owned Mefta company could sell
drip irrigation equipment to a Saudi-owned Mefta company and the equipment
would be loaded in a Jordanian truck for delivery to Saudi Arabia via the
sunken highway and Jordan without going through an Israeli checkpoint.
Seventy percent of the people in the Gaza Strip and 30 percent in the West
Bank are considered refugees -- 850,000 and 600,000 people respectively
for a total of 1,450,000. Since each Palestinian breadwinner supports
about 10 family members, 145,000 jobs removes all of them from the
refugees rolls.
Gaza Mefta also generates the jobs needed to resettle the remaining
dispersed Palestinian refugees, starting with the Diaspora Gaza refugees,
willing to move to Palestine Gaza. Assuming some one million
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria join the 850,000 already
in Gaza and 300,000 who move to Palestine Gaza from the West Bank, only
215,000 jobs are required since each Palestinian breadwinner supports an
average of 10 people. Palestine Gaza could support those 2.15 million
refugees in high-rise apartment buildings there. Hong Kong's 19-sq.-mi.
main business area supports almost 4 million people. So the 112-sq-mi.
Palestine Gaza can help solve the Palestinian refugees problem.
Sharon had long advocated jobs in Gaza to help solve the refugees problem.
Moreover, a future South Lebanon Mefta and a Golan Mefta could attract
most of the refugees in Lebanon and Syria so far fewer would move to Gaza
and far fewer jobs would be required.
Dr. Osama El Baz, the senior political advisor to Egypt President Hosni
Mubarak, in August 1996 supported a Port Mefta and Gaza Mefta. Egypt made
Gaza a tax-free area before its capture by Israel in the 1967 war. And
Egypt President Anwar Sadat called for making peace in Gaza first.
Gaza Mefta is established by a Mefta Peace Treaty and Mefta Treaty Annex
detailing the treaty agreed to by the Palestinian National Authority,
Palestine Liberation Organization, Israel and the MFO. The Mefta
Peace Treaty and Annex replace the Port Mefta Treaty and Annex. Both a
draft Mefta Peace Treaty and Annex are under corresponding rectangles at
the top of this section together with a map of Gaza Mefta and Palestine
Gaza, Maps 2-3.
Other countries wishing to do profitable business in Port Mefta and
generate many good Palestinian jobs, or simply support peace, accede to
the multilateral treaty. Acceding countries could easily exceed 100 of the
191 members of the United Nations. With most of the international
community doing business on rented building sites in Port Mefta as treaty
parties, the Palestinians could not effectively break the 35-year lease or
the treaty, even if they wanted to.
So there
are presently achievable solutions in Gaza to the issues of borders
(international border), Palestinian refugees (Mefta-generated jobs for
refugee breadwinners) and water (desalination using cheap offshore natural
gas).
In
that way peace is made in Gaza first. But it is a no-war (nonbelligerence,
nonviolence) business peace in a Gaza Strip primarily calmed by good and
secure Mefta-generated jobs. Israel would continue to rely on deterrence
and not trust. Israelis and Palestinians do not fight because violence is
very bad for business and thus Palestinian jobs. The business peace is
also based on business between Israel and Palestinians and other Arabs in
Gaza and the many Gaza Palestinian traders who do business in Israel, and
the employment by Israelis of Gazans in Gaza. Sustained violence would end
all of that business and the jobs that business generates.
"The Israelis would be wise to concentrate on economic relations and to
content themselves with the cessation of armed conflict and the
development of the minimum structure of contact and communication between
neighboring states that are at peace or, to be precise, not at war. In
time, resignation may grow into tolerance, tolerance to acceptance,
acceptance to goodwill and even friendship." Prof. Bernard Lewis, renowned
Middle East expert from Princeton University, writing in a 1999 essay,
"The Future of the Middle East."
UNIVERSALLY-BINDING NUCLEAR TEST
BAN CAN BLOCK
NORTH KOREAN AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR
MISSILES
North Korea in February 2005 declared that it possessed nuclear weapons,
and even more in April, almost surely simple fission weapons made from
plutonium. The North’s underground test on October 9, 2006, was almost
surely a simple fission weapon and certainly did not demonstrate mastery
of the required missile warhead technology. Even if North Korea has simple
fission weapons, a credible threat requires a successful test of a
launched warhead for a ballistic missile that can reach Japan and other
U.S. interests in the region. Then-Secretary of Defense William
Cohen, in October 1999 in support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
testified “proliferators can develop and stockpile simple fission
weapons without testing. However, the CTBT can keep the nuclear threat
from becoming greater than it otherwise could become. Proliferators, for
example, could not develop with confidence small, high yield strategic
warheads suitable for delivery by ballistic missiles.”
On
August 30, 1998, North Korea fired a three-stage missile over Japan, whose
dummy warhead reached Alaska. The North would have to successfully test a
warhead design for that missile to make sure it works when launched. And
possibly to sell warheads to customers like Iran.
The North cannot safely rely on successful delivery of an untested simple
and thus large bomb by a vulnerable transport aircraft.
A Universally-Binding Test Ban Treaty, to complement the CTBT not yet in
force, can block a test launch of a missile warhead to demonstrate that it
works. Until enactment of the treaty, China, a supporter with Russia of
such a universal test ban, must threaten Pyongyang with a cutoff of its
food and oil lifelines if it conducts another test. In return, the United
States must sign on and give up the possibility of future tests of new
nuclear weapons designs. Russia’s support was communicated to the author
in Moscow in June 2003 by Russian arms control official Oleg V. Rozhkov.
China’s support was disclosed in a conference in Beijing in July 2004 with
Ye Ru’an, Vice President, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association.
Beijing’s reluctance to strongly pressure Pyongyang to disarm in
response to administration urging probably reflects a requirement that the
Bush administration first sign a UBTBT.
A UBTBT would outlaw any nuclear test or threatened test anywhere by
anyone, including nonsignatories like North Korea and Iran. The treaty is
legislative because it requires adherence as parties of two-thirds
of the states including the five permanent members of the Security Council
before it enters into force and binds a nonparty against its will. It
would be enforced by a volunteer state authorized by the Security Council
after the International Atomic Energy Agency certified a violation or
threatened violation and all other efforts had failed. For example, by the
United States volunteering to destroy the North's targetable nuclear
weapons manufacturing facilities, especially its reprocessing plant,
with conventional cruise missiles if it did not disarm. That Security
Council threat, necessarily backed by veto-bearing China, would be coupled
with an offer of massive aid to Pyongyang and security guarantees. The
treaty would similarly help block nuclear proliferation to would-be
nuclear states like Iran. And probably prevent the sale of even a simple
large container-ship weapon to terrorists, who are most unlikely to pay
its enormous price without proof by a successful test that the weapon
works.
A UBTBT can soon enter into force since only agreement to its terms by the
five permanent members of the Security Council is required and virtually
all of the signatories to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would quickly
adhere. (Two-thirds of the 191
U.N. members is 127 members. The CTBT has over 170 signatories.)
The CTBT only binds parties and has not entered into
force because North Korea among other required nuclear-capable states is
not a party. A legal precedent for a UBTBT is the U.N. Charter which has
repeatedly been enforced against nonparties, notably North Korea.
And the Antarctic Treaty effectively prohibits any nuclear testing by
anyone in the Antarctic.
North Korea would deny it is bound by the UBTBT. And it would respond to a
Security Council threat to destroy its nuclear facilities, probably
for violating the treaty by preparing a test, with a credible threat to
burn Seoul if attacked. Bush would likely reply that after the first shell
hits Seoul, the heart of Pyongyang would be destroyed -- without saying
how. So after the treaty terms are agreed to by the five permanent members
of the Security Council, and the treaty is opened for signing and
ratification by the international community, China would immediately
and secretly face the North with this future catastrophic crisis scenario
ending in the destruction of the heart of its capital. Beijing should then
be able to persuade Pyongyang to give up its goal of obtaining a nuclear
deterrent by dismantling its nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons in a
complete, irreversible and verifiable manner in return for massive
financial, economic and energy aid – mostly provided by South Korea and
Japan -- and security guarantees and the end of sanctions with the
normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Washington. The North
would retain its conventional capability to destroy Seoul as a deterrent
to any U.S. aggressive action against it. It does not need a second
deterrent.
Blocking North Korea’s bomb would pave
the way to blocking Iran’s bomb. If North
Korea agrees to disarm to avoid a credible future threat to destroy the
heart of its capital, Iran would get the message that it would not be able
to test a nuclear warhead for its intermediate range ballistic missile
without similarly risking the loss of the heart of its capital.
China, North Korea's closest ally and the supplier of much of its food and
fuel, is the key to persuading its communist ally to terminate all
nuclear weapons activities. Just the threat of enforcing a UBTBT could be
sufficient.
But "the problem (with implementing a UBTBT) is not in Moscow or in
Beijing but in Washington," said Russian arms control expert Oleg V.
Rozhkov in Moscow on June 9, 2003. The author, in talks with China's top
arms control academics in Beijing June 19-21, 2004, confirmed their
support for a UBTBT. The author's argument to China for its support
follows.
So
the Bush administration should immediately support a UBTBT to help keep
the North Koreans and Iranians out of the nuclear warhead and blackmail
business. Its past reason for rejecting a UBTBT, that it does not
like treaties, no longer makes sense now that negotiations with North
Korea and Iran are going nowhere and only a UBTBT can peacefully
block their nuclear missiles.
Even leading treaty opposer Richard Perle allows that a quality treaty
should be taken on its own merit. A UBTBT is a quality treaty because,
with required China and Russia support, it can be effective in blocking
North Korea's nuclear missile programs. The North's leadership would
require a successful missile test of a warhead to make sure it worked and
could be sold. An underground test would not demonstrate mastery of the
needed warhead reduction technology. And the treaty can readily be
verified by the global earthquake seismic system and other current methods
for detecting tests.
Nuclear weapon testing is essential. "Since the dawn of the nuclear age no
(U.S.) nuclear weapon design has entered the stockpile without having the
pit (the plutonium core) certified through underground testing. . . . For
almost fifty years testing was the hub of the nuclear weapons wheel," Vice
Admiral Robert R. Morse, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former director of the Defense
Nuclear Agency, argued in A Different Approach to the 2005 NPT
Conference (Center for Security Policy, February 2005). He seeks to
end the existing moratorium on underground testing agreed to by the U.S.
in 1992.
Israel tested nuclear weapons twice using a howitzer off the shore of
South Africa according to top Russian arms control expert Oleg V.
Rozhkov in June 2003. See Nuclear Peace Mission rectangle above.
In
1965 the author told India's top arms control diplomat, Ambassador Vishnu
Trivedi, about his proposed UBTBT. India then proposed a
universally-binding test ban in 1965 and again in 1966 (then aimed at
China and so supported by Moscow) when urged to sign the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. India stated, "The first priority is the task of
making the Moscow (Partial) Test Ban Treaty universally binding." India
never signed the NPT. And neither it nor Pakistan has adhered to the CTBT,
also blocking its entry into force. Enactment of a UBTBT would outlaw any
further Indian and Pakistani tests. So they probably would adhere to it
since they would be bound anyway as nonsignatories.
The above ground war use of nuclear weapons would contaminate much of the
world's atmosphere with the death dealing debris of radioactive fallout.
Preventing global deaths is the legal rationale for binding potential
nuclear-war-making nonparties. (Teheran has
threatened to nuke Tel Aviv and ride out Israel’s nuclear retaliation.)
And why the administration
should follow China's and Russia's lead to soon enact a UBTBT and thus
help block further proliferation.
A UBTBT was the author's doctoral
dissertation.
A
draft treaty with commentary is under the Universal Test Ban rectangle at
the top.
In
a 93-day peace mission around the world during April-July 2003 the author
and his note-taking wife met with arms control experts in 12 foreign
ministries to discuss his proposed UBTBT. A report is under the Nuclear
Peace Mission rectangle at the top. Since it appears that if the
administration supports a UBTBT it would be implemented, the author on
July 31 met with key people in the Department of State and Department of
Defense to promote his treaty, and that report follows the Nuclear Peace
Mission report.
BLOCKING AN IRANIAN MISSILE WARHEAD
A nuclear terrorist Iran might carry out its repeated threat to wipe out
Israel. It could blackmail Europe, and could provide nuclear backing
for more 9/11’s and Madrid and London train bombings.
As early as 2001 leading Iranian
cleric Hashemi Rafsanjani called the establishment of the Jewish state the
"worst event in history." He said: "In due time the Islamic world will
have a military nuclear device, and then the strategy of the West would
reach a dead end, since one bomb is enough to destroy all Israel." Iran's
supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenai added "that the cancerous tumor
called Israel must be uprooted from the region." Its president, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, has repeatedly called in 2006 for Israel to be wiped
off the map.
Teheran can be blocked without draconian sanctions or
military force, both unpalatable to Europe, by a Universally-Binding Test
Ban Treaty. A UBTBT would outlaw all tests and threatened tests anywhere
by anyone, including nonsignatories like Iran and North Korea, as
described above.
Meanwhile Iran is continuing its P2 centrifuge uranium enrichment program
with the goal of developing a nuclear warhead for its Shihab-3 ballistic
missile that can reach Israel, U.S. bases in the region and southern
Europe. Teheran would have to successfully test a launched warhead to
prove it is a nuclear missile power. An underground test would not
demonstrate mastery of the complex missile warhead technology. Any test,
threatened test, or detected preparations for a test would be a violation
of the UBTBT.
The treaty would be enforced by a volunteer state authorized by the
Security Council after the International Atomic Energy Agency certified a
violation or threatened violation by Iran and diplomatic efforts fail. The
U.S. would likely volunteer to surgically destroy Teheran’s targetable
nuclear facilities with conventional cruise missiles if it did not
irreversibly and verifiably dismantle all its nuclear facilities.
Just the threat of enforcing the treaty should persuade Teheran to end its
nuclear missile program since it could not safely perfect and demonstrate
a working missile warhead for deterrence or nuclear blackmail. Iran cannot
deter or blackmail with a reliable though untested simple bomb so large
that it is deliverable only by a vulnerable aircraft or detectable
container ship. So, unlike missile warheads, simple bombs are hardly worth
the huge monetary and political costs.
Iran would deny it is bound by the UBTBT. It probably would respond to
Security Council authorization to surgically destroy its targetable
nuclear facilities for violating the treaty with a threat to destroy Tel
Aviv and U.S. bases if attacked. Washington would likely reply that if a
missile is detected being prepared for launch, or is launched, the heart
of Teheran would be destroyed. So after the treaty terms are agreed to by
the P5 and the treaty opened for signing and ratification, the EU3
(Germany, France and UK) would immediately and secretly face Iran with
this catastrophic crisis scenario ending in the destruction of the heart
of its capital. The EU3 should then be able to persuade Teheran to give up
its goal of developing nuclear weapons by dismantling all its nuclear
facilities in an irreversible and verifiable way. In return, Iran would
receive substantial economic benefits, security guarantees and the end of
all sanctions against it with return of its US-held assets. And
normalization of relations with the US and entrance into the World Trade
Organization after it ceased exporting terror.
Then-U.S. national security advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice on August 8,
2004, said: “I think you cannot allow the Iranians to develop a nuclear
weapon. The international community has got to find a way to come together
and to make certain that that does not happen.” Dr. Rice, as Secretary of
State, has continued to call for blocking an Iranian nuclear weapon. A
Universally-Binding Test Ban Treaty would unite the international
community against the development of nuclear weapons by Iran and North
Korea.
ARGUMENT TO CHINA FOR IT'S SUPPORT
OF A
UNIVERSALLY-BINDING TEST BAN TREATY
The DPRK
(North Korea) was threatened by the United States with nuclear attack
twice: to end the Korean War and to free the U.S.S. Pueblo sailors.
Washington has a preemption policy to prevent further nuclear
proliferation to states like the DPRK. Thus, Pyongyang’s leadership surely
believes its very survival depends on having a nuclear deterrent to block
further nuclear “black mail,” even if its country has to starve. So
dialogue is very likely to fail whatever concessions are offered including
an American peace treaty. Moreover, the DPRK, like Iran, says it has the
right to a peaceful nuclear program even if it agrees to dismantle its
nuclear weapons facilities. And there will be no inspections until an
agreement on dismantling its nuclear weapons is reached under a peace
treaty. (There is no way Washington would accept these conditions.)*
China
will not cut off oil and food supplies to Pyongyang to block nuclear
weapons because of the danger of collapse of the communist regime with
millions of impoverished refugees fleeing into China, who would have to
feed and house them. There is also the danger that the North would then be
taken over by the South. In that event such a unified Korea would have a
GDP the size of Germany before unification, and with nuclear weapons. That
Korea would control China’s shipping lanes.
The DPRK
probably can build a working crude ship container plutonium bomb without a
test for sale to al Qaeda. But with a price likely to be in the 100s of
millions if not billions, the terrorists would require a test –
illegal under a UBTBT -- to make sure it worked. They would not buy a pig
in a poke.
Pyongyang would have to successfully test a warhead on a launched missile
to be able to clearly prove that it had a nuclear missile deterrent and in
order to sell missile warheads to countries like Iran. An underground test
would not demonstrate mastery of the complex missile warhead technology.
Detected preparations for such an atmospheric test would be a threatened
violation subject to sanctions by the Security Council, as would the DPRK
again threatening a test.
A UBTBT would outlaw all tests and
threatened tests anywhere by anyone, including nonsignatories like the
DPRK and Iran. It can promptly enter into force since only agreement to
its terms by the five permanent members of the Security Council is
required and virtually all of the signatories to the CTBT would quickly
adhere to legislate a ban with the required two thirds of the states. The
treaty would unite virtually the entire world against the development of
nuclear weapons by the DPRK. But meanwhile Pyongyang is continuing to
complete nuclear weapons. (So time is of the essence to enact a UBTBT.)
A UBTBT would
be enforced by a volunteer state authorized by the Security Council after
the International Atomic Energy Agency certified a violation or threatened
violation and diplomatic efforts fail. The U.S. would volunteer to
surgically destroy the DPRK’s targetable nuclear weapons manufacturing
facilities with conventional cruise missiles if it did not irreversibly
and verifiably dismantle all its nuclear facilities, including peaceful
facilities. China could not veto such sanctions because it is strongly
against further proliferation. So Pyongyang could not rely on Beijing to
veto sanctions.
China, the
DPRK's closest ally and the supplier of much of its food and fuel, is the
KEY to persuading its communist ally to terminate all nuclear activities.
Just the threat of enforcing a UBTBT is most likely to succeed.
The DPRK
would deny that it is bound by the UBTBT. And it would respond to a
Security Council threat to destroy its nuclear facilities for violating
the treaty with its own credible threat to flatten Seoul if attacked. Bush
would likely reply that after the first shell hits Seoul, Pyongyang would
be destroyed -- without saying how. So after the treaty terms are secretly
agreed to by the five permanent members of the Security Council, China
would immediately and secretly face the DPRK with this catastrophic crisis
scenario ending in the destruction of its capital. Beijing should then be
able to persuade Pyongyang to give up its goal of obtaining a nuclear
deterrent by dismantling its nuclear facilities in a complete,
irreversible and verifiable manner in return for massive financial,
economic and energy aid – mostly provided by South Korea and Japan -- and
security guarantees and the end of sanctions with the normalization of
relations between Pyongyang and Washington. The DPRK would retain its
conventional capability to destroy Seoul as a deterrent to any U.S.
aggressive action against it. PYONGYANG DOES NOT REALLY NEED A SECOND
DETERRENT.
China must secretly negotiate such a settlement so that the DPRK leaders
do not lose face.
But if
China does not support the treaty, the nonproliferation regime would end
with the spread of offensive nuclear weapons to Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan to deter Pyongyang blackmail. That is because of the then required
mutual assured destruction and mutual assured retaliation, doctrines
Beijing strongly supports instead of ABM defenses.
Only a credible
threat to destroy Pyongyang will persuade the DPRK leaders to dismantle
their nuclear facilities completely, irreversibly and verifiably. And the
UBTBT provides that credible threat.
Moreover, the U.S., having failed to ratify the CTBT, now would be bound
by a comprehensive test ban. But Washington’s consequent inability to test
a new warhead for bunker busting bombs would be NO LOSS since there is no
way it could accurately target, in Pyongyang’s hundreds of kilometers of
deep tunnels, P2 centrifuge uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons
assembly facilities.
Every
day 20,000 ships dock in U.S. ports. On any day there are 250 million
containers in transit or in ports. It would be almost impossible to find
the terrorist ship container with the purchased nuclear bomb (probably
lead shielded to prevent detection at sea by over flying helicopters). For
that reason alone the Bush administration should support a
UBTBT.
Also,
the fallout from a megaterrorist explosion of a ship container nuclear
bomb off the shore of New York City would radiate my house some 50
kilometers north with death dealing radioactive sea salts. So I have a
personal interest in preventing that megaterrorist catastrophe.
(Washington would be subject to the same megaterrorist catastrophe with
the explosion of a ship container bomb off the adjacent Delaware or
Virginia shore.)
*Parenthetical
statements were not made to the Chinese arms control experts but have been
added to supplement the argument for China and U.S. support of a UBTBT.
MORE PORT MEFTA AND
GAZA MEFTA DETAILS
Port Mefta would comprise about 2% of the 364-sq.-km. (140-sq.-mi.) Gaza
Strip leased from the Palestinian Authority by the MFO for 35 years. The
lease would automatically be renewed by 15-year periods unless terminated
by the Palestinians for any reason on five years' notice, with all of its
land then becoming part of Palestine.
Port Mefta's deep water harbor would be constructed by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, who would supervise construction of the remaining port
infrastructure. A first phase construction of hotels, office
buildings and factories would be completed in two years.
The port
would all but eliminate Palestinian dependency on ground transport through
the Israel border and substantially expand the potential of Palestinian
trade with countries other than Israel. It would employ thousands of
Palestinian workers, and substitute for the Gaza City seaport demolished
by Israel. The Gaza International Airport at Dahaniya would be upgraded to
handle the additional Mefta traffic, with security controlled by the MFO
to block smuggling.
Port Mefta would be a free port/special economic area like Singapore. It
would be open to companies of all nationalities, especially Palestinian
and Israeli, who would do low-labor-cost, free trade business. It would
have office buildings, factories, hotels, gambling, and duty- and tax-free
shopping, and quickly generate thousands of good Palestinian jobs,
especially in construction. Palestinian workers would commute from
Palestinian-controlled areas.
Port
Mefta, and the later Gaza Mefta which incorporates it, would provide a
very friendly long-term secure investment environment relatively free of
corruption. It would have business communities for manufacturing,
commerce, tourism, and research and development, many speaking a
common language and with their own executive housing.
The MFO would establish from among its members -- Australia, Canada,
Colombia, Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Uruguay and
the U.S. -- a Mefta Authority Cabinet to govern Port Mefta and set policy
guidelines. English would be the official language and the U.S. dollar the
official currency. The authority would also include Russia, the E.U.,
Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (later Palestine).
Decisions would be taken by majority vote.
The Mefta Authority Cabinet would appoint a Mefta Administration
comprising English-speaking civil servants of many nationalities --
particularly Palestinian, Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian -- to administer
Port Mefta. An English-speaking Mefta International Police Force would
include those nationalities plus MFO nations' police. The MFO Fijian
battalion (530 soldiers), which presently observes the southern Gaza
border, would be assigned to the international police force with a support
unit for a total of 600. The former Fiji battalion in the Lebanon UNIFIL
force would replace the transferred Fiji battalion. The United States MFO
contingent would stay in the Sinai or partially be replaced by a U.K.
contingent to include London in the administration of Mefta.
Companies would lease building sites from the MFO at rentals reflecting
the skyrocketed value of the limited land available. Palestinian and
Israeli sites would be rent free. The sites would be allocated by lots
drawn by all participating states, except that the best sites would go to
the Palestinian Authority, Israel and the Mefta Authority Cabinet
countries. Company executives could be of any nationality. But all
nonexecutive labor would be Palestinian, except in the former Israeli
settlements at their option. The Palestinian Authority would issue the
work permits and allot the Palestinian building sites. Port Mefta would be
fully funded by the site lease rents and infrastructure donations by the
international community, and shared profits from the duty-free shopping
business. The Palestinian Authority would get 20% of the site rents. The
remaining 80% is to ensure that Port Mefta is operated at a profit, with
all profits reinvested in added infrastructure.
Port Mefta would be bordered on its land sides by an Israeli-designed
high-tech anti-smuggling barrier (about $.25 million per
kilometer). The barrier would help block smuggling of duty-free goods out
and terrorists, drugs, arms and explosives in. Its coast would be
patrolled by the Mefta, Palestinian Authority and Israel coast guards
under the command of the Mefta Police Commander (Italian).
Israeli-Palestinian trade, Israeli-Egyptian trade and Israeli-Jordanian
trade would develop as intra-Mefta business.
An
Israeli or Palestinian car with Mefta plates and Mefta insurance could be
driven to Europe via Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey.
Terrorists would risk exposure in Mefta because terrorist actions would
drive investors and tourists away, with the consequent loss of many
Palestinian jobs.
Port Mefta would be established by the Port Mefta Treaty. The Port Mefta
Annex details the treaty. A treaty law annex would incorporate a
constitution, laws and regulations of Port Mefta, including a pro-free
trade commercial code, like Singapore's, using Rules of Origin in the
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement for duty-free treatment of exported
goods, except there would be no requirement for an Israeli component.
A
Mefta business peace is profitable so it will long endure without donors.
The basis for the profit is high site lease rents reflecting the
skyrocketed value of real estate after the investment-friendly and secure
international free trade area is established.
So
Mefta is a key to a no-war comprehensive business peace in the Middle
East. Its goal is peaceful business coexistence (PBCX). That includes a
later no-war business peace between Syria and Israel, and between Lebanon
and Israel, based on deterrence. No trust is required between Arabs and
Israelis.
SUNKEN HIGHWAY FROM
PORT MEFTA TO THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN
James Wolfensohn, the Quartet
's Special Envoy for Gaza
Disengagement,
proposes to
connect Gaza with the West Bank by a sunken four-lane highway in a five
meter-deep trench surrounded by double fences to keep people from leaving
it for Israeli territory. Israeli traffic would cross via overpasses. The
cost, about $200 million.
An optional extension to Jordan would cost about $150 million.
The European Union seeks a greater role in Mideast peace making. With an
E.U.-funded highway from Port Mefta to the West Bank, Israel would assign
criminal and traffic jurisdiction over all vehicles using the highway to
neutral MFO international police, as would Palestine for the portions of
the highway passing over its land. The highway would connect to the West
Bank just south of Hebron. It would be 45 miles (70 kilometers) long, with
no vehicle access to pre-1967 Israel. Part of the highway costs would be
financed by E.U.-guaranteed, euro-denominated bonds paid off by highway
use tolls. At the Gaza toll station the international police would video
monitor all passengers and use computer face matching to block perceived
terrorists from later exiting into the West Bank.
Israel would also grant the MFO a renewable 35-year easement to continue
the highway 31 miles (50 kilometers) to the Jordan border at the
four-lane King Hussein Bridge, together with exclusive MFO patrol. That
would provide Jordanian trucks with a little over one hour access to the
Mediterranean via the free Port Mefta, immensely expand Amman's trade with
the West Bank and Gaza, and so substantially spur Jordan's economy.
The highway would greatly increase needed support of the Jordan-Israel
peace treaty by Jordanians. The Jordan extension would be similarly
financed by the European Union.
Sharon had offered to provide the Palestinians with a railroad link from
Deir El Balah in central Gaza to the West Bank. So the Olmert
government would surely agree to a far more secure sunken highway
from Port Mefta (adjacent Deir El Balah) if the E.U. would pay for it.
POWER-DESALINATION PLANT IN PORT MEFTA
Port Mefta would have a $250 million integrated steam-power-desalination
plant to generate affordable water and power for the Palestinians and
Jordanians, as well as for Port Mefta and later Gaza Mefta, using natural
gas from -gas deposits off the Gaza coast. Germany has offered to fund
such a plant. (It would supplement the small power plants presently being
built in Gaza.) The plant would employ some 1,500 Palestinians.
Construction would take about 18 months and employ many construction
workers.
Cheap energy has been discovered by the British Gas company in natural gas
deposits beneath the waters off the Gaza Strip and Israel's coast, enough
to supply the whole of Israel's gas consumption for at least 15 years. Of
this, approximately 80 percent is in Gaza waters while no more than 20
percent is in the Israel maritime zone. British Gas would invest $400
million to produce 1.5 billion cubic meters of Palestinian gas every year.
The sale of that quantity would produce revenues amounting to $300 million
per year, making the $400 million cost profitable.
The Gaza portion of the natural gas can be sold to Israel and/or piped to
Jordan along the route of the sunken highway. And the gas at production
cost (excluding capital costs) can be used by Palestinians to desalinate
sea water at an affordable cost. But the Palestinian Authority, not being
a state, does not have a clear right to it. The Palestinians are dependent
on Israeli consent to use that cheap energy. They would be independent of
Israeli control if there were a Palestinian state in Gaza since under
international law a state owns the economic assets in and under its
territorial waters. The gas can thus energize business peace and make a
Palestine initially only in Gaza very valuable to the Palestinians.
Before
natural gas is available, Saudi Arabia would supply crude oil at $14 per
barrel so that the resulting desalinated water is affordable. The plant
would generate 120 megawatts of electric power and 50 million cubic meters
of desalinated water a year. With the capital cost of the plant donated,
the desalinated water would cost about 30 cents per cubic meter (compared
to 46.5-47 cents per cubic meter with the latest technology), and the
electricity about 4 cents per kilowatt hour (compared with Israel's 6+
cents per kilowatt hour). The water would be piped underground to the West
Bank and Jordan along the sunken highway route at a pipeline construction
cost of $230 million, including pumping stations. High-voltage power
transmission lines would be supported on towers along the highway route,
and provide power for the pumps. A fiber optical communications cable
would be mounted on the towers. The transmission line system with
substations and communications cable would cost about $60 million.
Desalinated water would be fed to Port Mefta and the Palestinians and
Jordanians, who would negotiate allocated amounts annually. The volume of
pure water provided to Jordan when mixed with Israeli brackish water would
satisfy Israel's treaty obligation to supply 50 million cubic meters of
drinkable water per year on top of the 60 million supplied from Lake
Kinneret. The pure water supplied to the Palestinians would also be mixed
with brackish water to reduce Israel's current supply of 35 million cubic
meters per year of drinkable water correspondingly, and replace the water
used in the former settlements which is pumped from outside of the Gaza
Strip rather than from local wells.
The total cost of the initial Port Mefta business peace projects is $1
billion comprising: Port Mefta infrastructure including harbor, $160
million; sunken highway, $130 million; power-desalination plant, $250
million; desalinated water pipeline, $230 million; power and communication
lines, $60 million; miscellaneous (including anti-smuggling barrier, Gaza
International Airport upgrade and unexpected contingencies), $170 million.
The G8 July summit pledged up to $3 billion annually for three years for
Gaza development. The European Union previously pledged some $5 billion
for Middle East peace projects. The U.S., Canada and Norway, and MFO
financial supporters Japan, Germany and Switzerland, would also
contribute.
A PROVISIONAL WEST BANK PALESTINIAN
STATE
In
the past Sharon offered a provisional Palestinian West Bank state in
return for Palestinian cooperation in effectively fighting terrorism. He
offered economic cooperation, development of combined desalination
projects and no new settlements. He wanted people-to-people projects
including stopping incitement in books and in the media while fostering
educational programs geared to teaching peace to both sides, starting with
school-age children. But Israel would continue to maintain full control of
the border crossings, access and control of air space, eastern and western
security zones and the most vital underground water aquifers, as well as
strategic roads connecting the Coastal Plain to the Jordan Valley. And
there would be no Palestinian treaties with hostile countries, according
to Sharon.
Sharon had reportedly supported a demilitarized Palestinian state in 52%
of the West Bank (Ha'aretz, Eldar, 4/17/00). And he was against evacuating
many West Bank settlements, especially those with historical value (like
Hebron) and settlements with security value.
Even so, in a further interim agreement, a duty-free provisional Palestine
West Bank would extend to 52% of the West Bank. It would comprise
three tunnel-connected contiguous districts, one south of Jerusalem and
two north of it, where 90% of the Palestinians live, with its
administrative capital in Abu Dis, in view of the Haram al-Sharif (Temple
Mount). Each district would be enclosed by an anti-smuggling barrier. The
settlers in the would-be districts -- 8% in one-third of the settlements,
all small -- would be compensated to relocate to larger settlements.
Olmert would make the painful concession of giving up those small
settlements to maintain good relations with Washington.
The separation barrier would be completed but would not be the border. The
status quo would continue with respect to the larger West Bank settlements
and strategic roads (Trans-Samaria, Beit Horon and Allon roads), several
strategic heights that look to the east, Jerusalem, the Jordan Rift Valley
and the West Bank water sources. Only 1/10th of the Palestinian
population in the West Bank would remain under Israeli jurisdiction,
enabling Israel to check terrorist activity there with relative ease.
Ninety-two percent of the Jewish settlers would continue to live outside
these Palestinian districts in two thirds of the settlements, including
Eilon Moreh, Shilo, Ofra, Beit El and Kiryat Arba in the east, Ma'aleh
Adumim in the center and several settlements to the west. Only by removing
8% of the settlers can Israel establish a separation border that
guarantees security for the country, for the soldiers that must otherwise
protect them and for the settlers themselves.
According to Clinton Bailey (Oct. 30, 2000 Jerusalem Post Internet
Edition), this plan for separation has been presented to all Israeli
governments over the past 15 years, but has always fallen over the
necessity of removing this 8% of the settlers, even to other settlements.
These settlers would have an opportunity to sell their homes to
Palestinian buyers at the best prices they could get. Replacement homes
would be provided or built by the government for them in their chosen
settlements that will remain under Israeli control after the establishment
of Palestine West Bank. The government would pay the difference between
the cost of a replacement home and the amount received for the sold home.
For those settlers who do not sell their homes to Palestinians, the Israel
government would purchase them at their fair market value and subsidize
any difference in price for each of the replacement homes on
Israeli-controlled land. Israel would then negotiate the bulk sale of all
of the previously unsold homes to Palestine and absorb any loss not
internationally compensated for.
Each of the three duty-free Palestine West Bank districts would be
surrounded by an anti-smuggling barrier, with the barrier around the
Southern District at least completed prior to the establishment of
Palestine West Bank. Abu Dis would be the administrative capital of
Palestine. The district capital of the Southern District of Palestine West
Bank would be Hebron, with Ramallah the district capital of the Central
District and Nablus the Northern District. The Northern and Central
Districts would be connected by a below ground U-shaped cross section,
chain fence covered safe passage tunnel. The tunnel would be the same as
the sunken highway connecting Mefta with the West Bank but chain-fenced
covered. The Central District's El-Bira would eventually similarly be
connected to western Jericho. Southeastern Jericho would be similarly
connected to the entrance to the sunken highway on the west side of the
Jordan River near the four-lane King Hussein Bridge. The West Bank exit of
the highway would be near Hebron.
Palestine West Bank would have a U.N.-guaranteed access to Gaza Mefta via
the sunken highway patrolled solely by the MFO, who would also solely
patrol the district-connecting tunnels. Israel and Palestine would each
grant a renewable 35-year easement to the MFO for the highway and each of
the safe passage tunnels. Israel would also time share with the
Palestinians the daylight use of the eastern ring road to be constructed
between Ramallah and Bethlehem via Abu Dis just beyond Jerusalem's eastern
border. The road would be edged by anti-smuggling barriers and patrolled
solely by the MFO on Palestinian daylight use times, with intervening
exits then blocked by Israel border police.
Palestinians traveling to and working in Israel would require passports
and visas. All goods entering Israel would be subject to Israeli customs,
tariffs and regulations.
Since there would be no agreement concerning the Temple Mount (Haram
al-Sharif) or the refugees' "right of return" and thus no "end of the
conflict," Israel and Palestine would only have a no-war business peace,
based on Israeli security and deterrence, not trust. The Palestinian
leadership would make the painful concession of temporarily
settling for less than the sought West Bank land because the Palestinians
would retain their goal of a Palestinian state in the entire West Bank
with East Jerusalem as its capital. While there would be a Palestinian
obligation to help block terrorism in Israel proper and maintain calm in
the Gaza Strip, where the Palestinian state starts, in the later truncated
West Bank state Palestinians would have the legal right to continue a
nonviolent struggle for a state in all of the West Bank including
East Jerusalem and for each refugee's right of return. There would be no
Palestinian obligation to cooperate on security in the remaining West Bank
under sole Israeli control. But violence there would drive away investors
and tourists at the loss of West Bank Palestinian jobs. So those jobs also
would be jobs for calm and peaceful business coexistence. Moreover,
anti-Israeli violence emanating from the Palestinian state could be
considered by Israel as an act of war justifying defensive measures
against the state.
In the meantime, 90% of the West Bank Palestinians and all of the Gaza
Palestinians would be free of Israeli occupation. They would have a
duty-free viable state in a booming Gaza and, via the solely MFO-patrolled
sunken highway and the region-connecting tunnels, also in the West Bank --
plus real security under U.N. guarantee, and affordable desalinated water.
Most of all, the region would not slide into a war Egypt and Jordan fear.
A
no-war business peace can be established by the following steps: (1) a
Port Mefta in Gaza under MFO administration; (2) a nonthreatening
duty-free Palestine in Gaza; (3) a Gaza Mefta comprising the former Gush
Katif added to Port Mefta; (4) a sunken highway from Port Mefta to the
West Bank and Jordan; (5) extension of Palestine to 52% of the West Bank.
In the West Bank, the state would start two years after it starts in Gaza,
at which time Israel would withdraw to the 52% borders. This sequence
would allow for a sustained period of calm later in the West Bank, which
will require regaining continuous control of all of the militants
there.
A no-war business peace means that Israelis and Palestinians only need
tolerate each other in peaceful (free of violence) business coexistence.
For the large majority of Israelis who favor separation (disengagement)
from the Palestinians believing that the two peoples cannot live together
peacefully, the proposed no-war business peace would have the following
benefits: (1) Israel would be freed of the moral responsibility of
political and economic difficulties since there would be a Palestinian
state rather than occupied areas; (2) anti-smuggling barriers between the
two states would limit Palestinians to legal workers who return to
Palestine rather than stay in Israel; (3) Palestinian-associated crime
would substantially decrease because people can no longer escape over the
border into immunity; and (4) the end of open borders would greatly lessen
access to Israel by terrorists. These benefits would be enhanced by
the present defense barrier being constructed to block terrorists from
entering Israel proper.
Palestine West Bank would be established by
a Palestine West Bank Annex to the Mefta Peace Treaty agreed to by
Palestine Gaza, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Palestinian
Authority, Israel and the MFO, to be added to this web site. Map 7 is a
map of Palestine West Bank.
MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS