REPORT ON  NUCLEAR PEACE MISSION OF
DR. S. C. YUTER TO 12 COUNTRIES APRIL-JULY 2003*

SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR PEACE PLAN
 (See http://www.mefta.org for draft treaty and commentary)

Universally-Binding Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (UBTBT) outlaws all nuclear tests anywhere by anyone, including any nonparties like North Korea and Iran.  The treaty legislates the ban to bind nonparties so it requires the adherence of two-thirds of the states including the five permanent members of the Security Council (who alone fix its terms) before it enters into force. Only the Security Council can enforce the treaty and only if the International Atomic Energy Agency first certifies a violation or threatened violation. The treaty unites the entire international community, specifically including China and Russia, in support of a Security Council threat to destroy the North Korean nuclear weapons facilities if it does not verifiably and irreversibly end its nuclear weapons programs. The US volunteers its military force to back the threat, which is coupled with massive international economic aid to Pyongyang and recognition of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a normal state of the international community led by its present government.

HIGH POINTS OF NUCLEAR PEACE PLAN
FOREIGN MINISTRY CONFERENCES

Moscow, June 9, 2003 conference with Counsellor Oleg V. Rozhkov, Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs.  He says the problem (in implementing a UBTBT) is not in Moscow or Beijing but in Washington.  His inquiry to the Bush Administration (re support of a UBTBT) has not been answered. The attached summary was faxed to him before our meeting.

Beijing, June 6, 2003 conference with Wang Ni, Deputy Director  of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department.  He was generally supportive and said I should give a talk to the Association of Arms Control and Disarmament of China who arranged a 15 person conference in four days.

Seoul, May 27, 2003 conference with Rhee Soo-taek, Deputy Director General for Disarmament.  He said South Korea would adhere to a UBTBT but was worried about getting the signatures of two-thirds of the states.

Generally, every arms control official I talked with supported a UBTBT and most said, like the Russian, the problem with implementation is in Washington.

UBTBT IS BEST IF NOT THE ONLY WAY TO PEACEFULLY
END NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS

The DPRK  has been threatened with nuclear attack to end the Korean War and again to free the USS Pueblo sailors. The US administration has a  preemption policy to prevent further nuclear proliferation to states like North Korea. The result is that the North Korean leadership believes its very survival depends on having a nuclear deterrent to block further nuclear “black mail”, even if its country has to starve, to build the required nuclear-tipped missiles that can reach the US.  Thus dialogue is doomed to failure whatever concessions are offered including a US “non-aggression pact.” Pyongyang is trying to buy enough time with its negotiation policy to obtain that deterrent with a successful missile test of a warhead small enough to mount on its longest range missile.

Nothing short of a credible Security Council threat  to destroy their reprocessing plant and other nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities that can be targeted, necessarily backed by China and Russia, can be effective to block that goal without the use of force.  That threat can be attained via my treaty, which can be negotiated and enter into force before any North Korean test, if  Rozhkov is right that the treaty is acceptable to Beijing. Its acceptance can soon be determined by asking it to sign the treaty. The alternative is to wait to see if Beijing will later support a US-lead non-UN “coalition” threat to destroy the North Korean nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities if it does not end its nuclear weapons programs, and Chinese support might not be forthcoming.

North Korea will respond to any such threat with its own threat to flatten Seoul if attacked. The US would then respond that after the first shell hits Seoul, Pyongyang will be destroyed. After the treaty terms are fixed by the five permanent members of the Security Council and the treaty is opened for signature and ratification by at least the needed two thirds of the states, China would face North Korea with this catastrophic crisis scenario. I believe Beijing will then persuade Pyongyang to give up its goal of obtaining a nuclear deterrent and accept massive economic aid, and join the international community as a normal state under its present government. The DPRK would retain its capability to destroy Seoul as a deterrent to any US aggressive action against it.

Ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program with a UBTBT is immensely more important than a possible option to physically test nuclear bunker busting bombs.

*Capital cities of New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Korea, China, Russia, Lithuania, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Belgium and United Kingdom.  S. C. Yuter is president of the Mefta Institute in New York.  His doctorate is in international law and a Universally-Binding Test Ban Treaty was his doctoral dissertation.
 

Dr. S. C. Yuter, President
Mefta Institute
407 Cedar Drive West
Briarcliff Manor, N.Y. 10510
Tel: 914-762-0111, Fax: 914-762-3348
scyuter@mefta.org, www.mefta.org

August 7,  2003

Dr. Robert G. Joseph
Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy,
Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense
National Security Council
By fax to 202-456-9180

Re: Universally-Binding Test Ban Treaty to Block North Korean and Iranian Nuclear Missiles

Dear Dr. Joseph,

This report supplements my July 25 letter and Report On Nuclear Peace Mission of Dr. S. C. Yuter to 12 Countries April-July 2003, and answers the most significant questions asked during my July 31 conferences with those copied below.

BACKGROUND: A legislated Universally-Binding Test Ban Treaty would outlaw all nuclear tests and threatened tests anywhere by anyone including nonparty North Korea's and Iran's tests. Their leaderships would almost surely require a successful test of a missile warhead to make sure it worked and could be sold. It took China some 40 tests to perfect nuclear missiles. Verification is readily assured by the vast world array of seismic and other methods of detecting tests.

THRESHOLD QUESTION: Does my proposed UBTBT meet Richard Perle's "quality agreement taken on its own merit?"

ANSWER: It does as explained in the accompanying letter in response to the statement of Ms. Jessica Zbravecky that the administration does not like treaties.

SECOND QUESTION: If the PRC is now not willing to back a threat to destroy North Korea's (targetable) nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities if Pyongyang does not permanently and verifiably end its nuclear weapons programs, then why should Beijing back such a Security Council threat under my treaty?

ANSWER: A UBTBT to enter into force requires the PRC as one of the required five permanent Security Council parties.  Enforcement of the treaty after the International Atomic Energy Agency certifies a violation or threatened violation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the Security Council envisions such a Security Council threat.  So if Beijing is not a party there is no UBTBT and no such threat.

If Beijing is a party then it is legally obligated to help enforce the treaty, even in the face of the following predictable catastrophic crisis: Pyongyang says it will flatten Seoul after the first cruise missile hits its reprocessing plant. President Bush responds (having withdrawn all of the US military personnel and families out of range of the North's artillery and rockets) that after the first shell hits Seoul the US will flatten Pyongyang. That threat would be coupled with a promise of massive international economic aid to the DPRK plus recognition by Washington of Kim Jong Il's government as an acceptable government of a normal (not a rogue) state. In that catastrophic crisis I believe China with Russian support would persuade the DPRK to permanently and verifiably end its nuclear weapons programs. Pyongyang would retain its capability to destroy Seoul as a deterrent to any US aggressive action against it.

But that predictable catastrophic crisis is avoidable. After the UBTBT is signed by the five permanent members and then opened for signature by the needed two thirds of the states, its prompt entry into force is assured by quick adherence to the treaty by virtually all of the parties to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. So when the treaty is opened for signature Beijing and Moscow would go to Pyongyang and I believe persuade the Kim Jong Il government to permanently and verifiably end its nuclear weapons programs in return for massive economic aid and recognition as a normal state, rather than risk that catastrophic crisis.

THIRD QUESTION: Is a UBTBT implementable?

ANSWER: It is if the PRC signs since the needed signatures and ratifications of two-thirds of the states are assured.  Russian Counsellor Oleg V. Rozhkov implies that Beijing would sign with his comment "that the problem (with implementing my treaty) is not in Moscow or Beijing but in Washington."  Whether Rozhkov is right about China's support can soon be tested by presenting a four-permanent-member signed UBTBT to Beijing for its signature. An added China incentive to sign is that its signature would effectuate a desired comprehensive test ban that blocked US testing.

FOURTH QUESTION: Is there a legal precedent for a treaty binding a nonparty against its will?

ANSWER: Under Article 2(6) of the UN Charter the Security Council repeatedly took action against nonparties, notably North Korea in the Korean War. And the Antarctic Treaty effectively prohibits any nuclear testing by anyone, including nonparties, in the Antarctic. Moreover, the above ground war use of nuclear weapons would contaminate much of the world's atmosphere with the death dealing debris of radioactive fallout. Preventing global deaths is the legal rationale for binding potential nuclear-war-making nonparties.

A UBTBT would unite virtually the entire international community including the PRC behind a Security Council resolution to militarily enforce it against the DPRK if it does not end its nuclear weapons programs. Whereas a military strike opposed by Beijing against the North's nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities by a US-led non-UN coalition could easily lead to conventional war on the peninsula, which could involve Japan.

QUESTION: What about Iran and other would-be nuclear weapons states?

ANSWER: If a UBTBT succeeds in blocking North Korean nuclear-tipped missiles, then Iran will get the clear message that it similarly will not be able to test nuclear warheads to put on  its missiles, or buy them from Pyongyang, and so Teheran would also have to permanently and verifiably end its nuclear weapons programs. The same for other would-be nuclear states.

But if  there is no UBTBT, or it is not successfully enforced, and North Korea succeeds in building nuclear-tipped  missiles, South Korea and Japan would almost surely go nuclear (and maybe even Taipei) as well as Iran ending the nonproliferation regime with the increased likelihood of nuclear warfare.

Nevertheless, there is in the administration a significant sector which wants to retain an option to test nuclear bunker busting bombs. Rozhkov's statement that the problem in implementing a UBTBT is not in Moscow or Beijing but in Washington presumably reflects the US refusal to ratify the CTBT. (That is understandable since the CTBT is inherently ineffective because it requires nonsigning North Korea and India as parties to enter into force.) So the US now retains an option to test nuclear bunker busting bombs by later withdrawing its CTBT signature. Adhering to a UBTBT would foreclose that option. But it would be only months to find out if a treaty can be implemented. If it can then blocking North Korea's and Iran's nuclear weapons programs is immensely more important than the possible development of such bombs, which would then not be needed to bust their bunkers.

CONCLUSION: Thus via a UBTBT a comprehensive test ban can be effectuated and the nonproliferation regime immensely strengthened to help maintain nuclear peace.

Sincerely,
Dr. S. C. Yuter

Fxc w/encl:
Dr. Andy Semmel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Department of State, at 202-647-1049
Mr. J. Dean Yap, Senior Political Officer, Office of Korean Affairs,
Department of State, at 202-647-7358
Ms. Jodi J. Kessinger, Country Director for Korea, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, at 703-695-8222
Mr. Scott Raphael Feeney, Country Director for Korea, Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Asia and Pacific Affairs, at 703-695-8222
Mr. Nelson V. Erickson, Defense Fellow Non-Proliferation Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy, at 703-693-0729

P.S. As promised, I will send a copy of this report, the accompanying letter and my July 25 report to each of the 12 arms control experts I conferred with during my nuclear peace mission -- especially to Counsellor Rozhkov of the Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Deputy Director Wang Ni of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, who promoted a June 6 conference on my UBTBT with much of the arms control establishment of China.
 

August 7, 2003

Ms. Jessica Zbravecky
Director of Arms Control
National Security Council
By fax to 202-456-9180

Re: Universally-Binding Test Ban Treaty Is a Richard Perle "Quality Agreement"

Dear Ms. Zbravecky,

This is in response to your August 1 telephone statement that the administration does not like treaties.

Please consider an exception to that general policy and support my proposed Universally-Binding Test Ban Treaty in view of my responses to the following statements of Richard Perle, noting  his reference to "quality agreements" and that "every treaty will be taken on its own merit" (citations available on request).

PERLE: "So the question is really the quality of the agreements, and not whether we are somehow in a category of lawlessness because we don't subscribe to the vision of a global set of regulations that lump together in a single arrangement both the liberal democracies that are protecting the values that are important to all of us, and the rogue states that challenge and threaten those fundamental values."

RESPONSE: My treaty is a quality agreement because it can be effective if supported by China to block rogue states' nuclear missiles by legislatively outlawing their required tests even though they are nonparties. And also because it is readily verifiable by the vast world array of seismic and other methods of detecting tests.

PERLE: "I think every treaty will be taken on its own merit. I think the era of arms control as we knew it during the Cold War has come to an end. . . . [Security goals] are to minimize the number of weapons possessed by the smallest number of states that we have any reason to fear might actually use those weapons to achieve political purposes."

RESPONSE: True re Cold War treaties. But my treaty can achieve those security goals because it is effective and readily verifiable. The NPT is ineffective because it allows for withdrawal on three months notice, which North Korea has done and Iran will surely do when it is ready to test a warhead. There is no withdrawal provision in my UBTBT. Though my treaty would block actual tests of nuclear bunker busting bombs, computer simulated tests would remain. And blocking North Korean and Iranian nuclear missiles, as well as those of other would-be nuclear states, is immensely more important to US security goals; in which case there is no need for such bombs.

PERLE: "If North Korea insists on continuing development of nuclear weapons, I think we'll have very serious problems, partly because the country provides technologies of ballistic missiles to other countries that are threatening the US. The combination of North Korean technologies, nuclear charges and policies are threatening us, and we'll have to find an adequate response to these actions. I think serious diplomatic cooperation in this field should be expected between the US, Russia, China and Japan in order to solve this problem."

RESPONSE:  True. Diplomatic cooperation in legislating a UBTBT is the best if not the only way peacefully to block Pyongyang's otherwise unstoppable survival strategy of building nuclear tipped missiles targetable on US interests. Since they have the ability to flatten Seoul there is no other coercive threat that can work without serious risk of a war the Pentagon has estimated would result in more than a million military and civilian casualties, including as many as a hundred thousand Americans killed. My treaty is effective because China is the key to persuading Pyongyang to verifiably end its nuclear weapons programs if as it appears my treaty is supported by Beijing, like it is supported by Russia and probably most of the other states including Japan.  Whereas it is extremely doubtful that Beijing would support a non-UN military threat by a US-led coalition, with the consequent risk of war.

PERLE re verification process: "Well, others have cheated in the past. . . . But I think verification of arms control treaties like the treaties themselves are a relic of the cold war.  I don't believe we need verification arrangements in the future.  I believe . . . . we should reduce our offensive forces unilaterally."

RESPONSE: True re arms reduction treaties.  My treaty is a nonproliferation treaty designed to block the further spread of nuclear tipped missiles, especially to North Korea and Iran.  Verification of a test violation is readily determined by the vast world array of seismic and other methods for detecting tests. And in some cases, like China and South Africa, outlawed threatened tests can be satellite observed in advance. In the case of North Korea it has already threatened to test and if publicly repeated after the treaty comes into force is a violation that requires no verification.

Also see the reasons for supporting my treaty in the accompanying supplemental report.

Questions are welcome.

Sincerely,
Dr. S. C. Yuter

Fxc (w/encl):
Mr. Richard Perle c/o of Mr. Douglas Feith at 703-697-6602
Hon. Richard B. Cheney c/o Mr. Scooter Libby at 202-456-6212
Hon. John R. Bolton c/o Ms. Susan Burk at 202-647-1049